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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines accountability in the con text of New Zealand’s  state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), and considers  an accountability fram ework which extend s beyond traditional 
(upward and outward) dim ensions.  W hile trad itional accountability d imensions are clea rly 
detailed in the legislatio n, less clear are th e dilemmas and contrad ictions faced by  SOEs, 
balancing multiple interests, and at tim es, conflicting objectives.  These issues are e xplored 
through interviews conducted in two phases ove r a two year period with senior executives 
from 12 of the then 17 SOEs operating in New Zealand.  Findings reveal a num ber of 
dimensions of accountability that extend beyon d current conceptualisations of accountability 
in the public secto r, often includin g m ultiple directions o f accountab ility.  Im plications 
suggest the need for a more explicit framework of accountability relevant to the SOE context, 
which may serve useful in identifying potential pathways to conflict mitigation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Accountability in the public s ector has been presented as elusive (Sinclair, 1995) and 
evolving (P arker and Gould, 1999; Sands, 2004) .  Operating as governm ent-owned but 
commercially focused, s tate-owned enterprises [SOEs] face a pointed ch allenge in balancing 
multiple in terests and,  at tim es, opposing  objectives.  W ith express p rofit-making 
requirements, as well as responsibility for soci al and environmental objectives, SOEs such as  
those in New Zealand have acc ountabilities clearly defined fo r them.  Less clear,  however, 
are the dilemmas and contradictions faced by SOEs in attempting to balance these objectives, 
as they try to operate independent of governm ent influence, yet are ulti mately answerable to 
government as shareholders, and also closel y monitored by a wider governm ent and non-
government audience (Norman, 2003).     
While New Zealand’s SOEs had tra ditionally been encouraged to focus on their co re 
business operations, in 2006 the New Zealand Government adopted a change in strategy.  On 
2 June 2006 Trevor Mallard, New Zealand’s then  Minister for State-Owned Enterprises, 
announced a new policy for SOEs, e ncouraging them to broaden the scope of their business 
operations into com plementary markets and r egions.  “SO Es will b e encouraged to expand 
into new areas of business that are linked to what they already do” (Mallard, 2006a, ¶2).   
Reinforcing the New Zealand Governm ent’s “long-term  hold” policy to retain 
ownership of SOEs, and aim ing to q uash the O pposition Party’s p romotion of privatisation,  
Mallard (2006a, ¶4) commented: 
New Zealanders have agreed that we shoul d keep state assets in public hands.  B ut 
that do es n ot m ean that th ey sho uld not  be put to work for us.  They’re big 
commercial operations and that’s why they’re perfectly placed to play a  key role in  
helping to change Ne w Zealand into an  inn ovative, hig h-wage, and high-value 
economy.   
 
In anticipation perhaps, of inevitable concerns regarding the potential financial risks relevant 
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to SOE expansion, Mallard also presented a framework outlin ing criteria for new projects, 
thereby addressing concerns of unnecessarily risky behaviour.  
There are risks, and the Governm ent is not about to play fast and loose with taxpayer 
assets (Mallard, 2006a, ¶9).   
 
The four point criteria for diversification included: 
• effective utilisation of existing core competencies into adjacent technologies, products and 
markets, 
• demonstrated potential to the competitive competencies of other firms and industries, 
• diversification financed from SOEs’ existing balance sheets, and 
• robust evaluation processes, explicit performance indicators, and clear exit routes for non-
performing ventures (Mallard, 2006a). 
 
While the announcem ent generated varied re sponses (ACT New Zealand, 2006; Kerr, 2006; 
Small, 2007), individual SOEs gene rally viewed the idea as positiv e.  However, perhaps the  
more pertin ent issue f rom the SOE sector’ s perspec tive was the related accoun tability 
implications.  As indiv idual com panies an swerable to multip le s takeholders, th e polic y 
encouraging SOEs to expand the scope of t heir operations gives rise to a number of 
accountability issues and implications.  Thus, in order to obtain a clearer understanding of the 
nature and scope of accountabil ity with respect to SOEs, this paper exam ines the risks  
perceived by SOEs and the related dimensions of accountability.   Specifically, the purpose of 
this paper is to consider “what are the dimensions and directions of accountability relevant to 
SOEs?” 
While literature on public sector accountabil ity acknowledges the inherent tensions  
(Hood, 1991), the question arises as to whether SOEs are different in the tensions they face.  
What are the overriding dimensions of accountability faced by SOEs?  Are they different to 
those faced by public sector organisations in general?  In an attempt to address these issues, 
interviews were conducted in two phases over a two year period with executives from  12 of 
the then 17 SOEs ope rating in New Zealand. 1  Evidence and insigh ts gained are used to 
                                                 
1 In late 2007, two SOEs merged, AgriQuality and Asure, leaving 16 SOEs operating in New Zealand. 
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compare prevailing accountability fra meworks within the public sector, and establish a 
framework specific to SOEs.  
This paper differs from prior research  by focusing specifically on accountability 
within the context of S OEs, exam ining both th e risks perceived by SOEs and th e re lated 
accountability im plications.  The following secti ons of this paper revi ew the literature on 
public sector accountability, and the operating context of SOEs in New Zealand.  An 
overview of the research m ethod, involving interviews with SOE executives is then 
presented, before exam ining the findings and im plications of this study for public sector 
organisations such as SOEs, policy-makers, and future research. 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY DIMENSIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
Legislation and regulatory fr ameworks governing SOEs commonl y provide clear details of 
accountability in a traditional (upw ard) context.  In New Ze aland, for example, Part 3 of the  
State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 specifically focuses on accountability, detailing explicit 
requirements on SOEs such as a Statem ent of  Corporate Intent, half yearly and annual 
reports, and annual audits conducted by the Au ditor-General (Palmer, 1988; Taggart, 1992).  
Further, a review of Government and ministerial announcements in relation to the SOE sector 
also rev eals clear exp ectations of  SOE con duct.  Such expectations include regular  
communication as part of the Government’s “no surprises” policy, return of surplus funds by 
way of dividends, and an understanding and awar eness of political an d ‘wider Governm ent 
policy issues’ (Cullen, 2003a, ¶24).  Thus, upward accountability is clearly addressed2.   
 Similarly, a review of the literature on public sector accountability also acknowledges 
extensive consideration of traditional dimensions (i.e. upward and to a lesser extent, outward) 
of accountability to higher levels of authority (Guthrie and Parker,  1998; Hodge and Coghill, 
                                                 
2 Though it is not without complexity.  For example, the negotiation and agreement between individual SOEs 
and Government on what represents “surplus” funds, can be the subject of significant debate. 
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2007).  In both theory and practice, however, noticeably less attention has been given to other 
dimensions of public sector accoun tability, such as public and political, and the rela tionships 
involved (Gray and Jenkins, 1993).  Further, very little regard has been given to 
accountability specifically in the context of SOEs (Chiu an d Hung, 2004), and the potential 
changes in accountability dimensions over time.   
As noted by Sinclair (1995), acco untability rem ains a cham eleon, and has been 
presented and exam ined from  various perspec tives.  Explanations of accountability range 
from a form (Mulgan, 1997a) or component of responsibility (Gregory, 1995); to control and 
oversight (O’Laughlin, 1990); explaining and taking responsibility for one’s actions (Sinclair, 
1995) versu s calling to  account fo r one’s acti ons and omissions (Th ynne and Goldring,  
1987); accounting for the use of resources (B allentine, Bri gnall, and Modell, 1998) vis 
effective application of the resources availa ble (White, 2005).  Such  accounts indicate both 
the variation within and evolving nature of accountability literature.  Thus, as research on this 
topic contin ues to grow, so too does the breadth of accountability (Sands, 2004).  W hile 
established channels of  reporting and for malised codes of responsib ility provide a clear 
outline of accountab ility, consideration of ethics , public ex pectations, and social consensus 
on what constitu tes good conduct and acceptab le performance (Day and  Klein, 1987), begin  
to blur the lines created.  Hence, in the contex t of the public sector, it is dif ficult to identify 
the boundaries of accountability, making the issue increasingly complex.   
Deconstructing public sector acco untability into its d ifferent dim ensions and 
directions provides the opportuni ty to identify its individua l com ponents, such that an 
accountability framework in the context of SOEs can be established.  This undertaking serves 
to sim plify the com plexity of public sector accountability, but also reconsider what the 
boundaries may be in a SOE context.  Such a process is particularly useful to develop a better 
understanding of accountability in a SOE context, given both the unique nature of SOEs, and 
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the increasing prominence of SOEs in numerous countries as part of new public m anagement 
practices (Polidano, 1999; Shirley, 1999).    
While few have exam ined accountability spec ifically in the cont ext of SOEs (Chiu 
and Hung, 2 004), numerous dimensions of public sector accountability are identified in the 
literature.  Robinson (1971) refe rs to m anagerial accountability  as both form al and direct, 
encompassing fiscal, process, and programme accountability.  Specifically, these components 
relate to m oney, procedures, and results, ex amining whether the intended outcom es have  
been achieved.  Thynne and Goldring (1987), and Stewart (1984) refer to political or upward 
accountability, consistent with W estminster traditions, such that govern ment representatives 
are directly accountable to an executive or pa rliament represented by and for the people.  
Mulgan (1997a) and Corbett (1992 ) examine public (outward or horizontal) accountability in 
the context of the public sector, referring to it as a direct and at tim es infor mal varian t of 
accountability encompassing individuals (inclu ding customers), comm unity groups, and the 
general public at larg e.  From  a si milar (external) perspective, professional accountability is 
considered in te rms of the duty  to comply as members with standards and regu lations set by 
various professional bodies, industry and government regulators (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987), 
as well as m aintaining a leve l of  credib ility and professional standing (Gray & Jenkins, 
1993).  Legal accoun tability is co nsidered by  Palm er (1988) and Taggart (1992 ) am ong 
others, referring to SOE s’ operations being wi thin a leg islative and regulatory fram ework, 
and subject to judicial review .  Fu rther, researchers exam ining eth ical aspects within the 
public secto r (Corbett, 1992) em phasise perso nal or inward accoun tability, referring to  
personal conscience of the individual(s) in charge.  This dim ension leads to a further  
distinction between actual (f ormal) and perceived accountabil ity (i.e. responsiveness) to 
stakeholders, without direct le gal authority or recourse.  T hus, a felt sense of obligation 
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(Gregory, 1995) implying a degree of prudence, judgement, and moral probity.  The various 
directions of accountability are shown in Figure 1 below. 
[insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
From a brief review of the l iterature, two issue s emerge.  First, ther e is a noticeab le 
emphasis on upward and outward dim ensions of  accountability.  And second, there is an 
implied distinction or clarity between the various  dimensions identified.  As noted by Parker 
and Gould (1999), however, acco untability in practice does not alwa ys reflect su ch clarity.  
This is particularly relevant to accountabi lity in the context of new public m anagement 
(NPM), which   
tends towards an assum ption that m anagement issues can  be separated from political 
issues…yet m any NPM changes reflect economic  and political ideologies which to 
date ar e m ore sta tements of  politic al f aith tha n em pirically dem onstrated f indings 
(Parker and Gould, 1999, p. 114).  
 
Stewart (19 84) considers som e of the co mplexities relevant to public sector 
accountability through  an exam ination of bon ds and link s of accoun tability, con trasting 
contractual obligations and res ponsibilities (e.g . m anagerial accountability) with cu stom or  
expectation (i.e. less formal public accountability).  Ryan, Dunstan, and Brown (2002) further 
examine the  com plexity of public  s ector accou ntability in  term s of the re lative f orce and 
importance of di fferent stakeho lder influen ces throug h a chain of accountabilities,  
emphasising accountability often extends beyond a two-party arrangem ent or relationship.  
Yet, predominantly, the emphasis remains on upw ard and ou tward accountability as distin ct 
dimensions.  Thus, the question arises as to whether other dim ensions or directions of 
accountability are relevant to public sector organisations such as SOEs. 
As noted by Hood (1991), the m any levels and dimensions of accountability give rise 
to tensions, inconsis tencies, and con flict.  Such conf lict is n ot new, ho wever by ex amining 
individual dim ensions and directions, potential pathways may be identified to m anage or  
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mitigate such conflict.  Accordingly , an examination of accountability in the context of New 
Zealand’s SOEs provides the opportunity to underta ke this exam ination as a first step, such 
that the second step (identifying pathways to conflict m itigation) m ay be broached in the 
future.  Prior to examining these issues, an overview of New Zealand’s SOEs as a contextual 
background to this study is presented below. 
 
CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND:  
NEW ZEALAND’S STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 
In the 1980s New Zealand underw ent significant government reform  with the intention of 
increasing efficiency and effectiveness within the public sector (Mulgan, 1997b; Scott, 2001).  
Such ref orms are consisten t with  the inte rnational tr end in public  sector m anagement 
intended to align m anagement of  the public s ector with tha t of  the private sec tor (Mar tin, 
2003).  Thus, this new approach focused on empha sising results and outcomes, together with 
effective use of public sector resources (Palmer, 1988).  As part of these reforms, government 
departments with a strong tradi ng function were corporatised or privatised, on the prem ise 
that such  services co uld be m ore effici ently provided by comme rcially orientated 
organisations, rather than subj ect to m inisterial c ontrol and governm ent interference.  The  
rationale for such reform was the inefficiency  of government as a provider of commercial 
services, due to protection from the discipline of a free m arket economy, often operating in a 
monopolistic environment, with the availability of on-going fi nancial support from  central 
government (Brash, 1996; Scott, 2001; Taggart, 1992).   
Specifically, New Zealand’s SOE reforms involved market deregulation, with express 
profit-making requirem ents im posed on SOEs, resultin g in acco untability f or both 
competitive services and  commercial results.  In  particula r, section 4(1)  of  New Zealand’s 
State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 provides: 
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The principal objective of every St ate enterp rise shall be to operate as a successful 
business and, to this extent, to be 
(a) As profitable and efficient as comparable businesses that are not owned by    
       the Crown; and 
(b) A good employer; and 
(c) An organisation that exhibits a sense of  social responsibility by having      
       regard to the interests of the comm unity in which it operates and by  
       endeavouring to accommodate or encourage these when able to do so. 
 
 
Other features of the refor ms included self-funding obligations , separation of SOE 
management and state, the role of Government as purchaser of outputs rather than provider of 
inputs, and perform ance based contracts and rewards (Mascarenhas, 1993; Spicer, 
Emmanuel, & Powell, 1996).   Thus, corpora tisation provided the opportunity for these  
departments to become both efficient and prof itable, enabling freedom of commercial choice 
and responsibility for comm ercial results.  Under the SOE Act (1986), where SOEs are  
required to m eet non-commercial and social obj ectives by Governm ent, these services m ust 
be purchased from individual SOEs.  Thus, an y non-comm ercial activities are transparent, 
and are effectiv ely fun ded on a fee for serv ice basis by the Governm ent.  Shareholding 
Ministers also appoin t a Board of Directors to  oversee management of each SOE.  Directo rs 
are appointed based on their business knowledge, skills, and experience, and are subject to  
directors’ duties outlined in th e Companies Act (1986), including th e duty to act in the best 
interests of the company. 
New Zealand’s public sector reform s with respect to SO Es are largely viewed as 
successful, implemented as initially intended, and resulting in increased efficiency of services 
to the public (Easton, 1999; Mulgan, 1997b; Sc ott, 2001).  Polidano (1999) refers to Ne w 
Zealand’s SOE refor ms as a system atic exampl e of new public m anagement in practice.  
Khaleghian and Das Gupta (2005, p. 1084) view  New Zealand as a “poster country” for new 
public management, due to the success of its “sweeping reforms”. 
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Despite recognition of success, how ever, debate continues to resurf ace on the f uture 
of New Zealand’s SOEs (Bennett, 2007; James, 2002; Oliver, 2007).  Outlining their position 
on such debate, the New Zealand Governm ent announced an intention not to prepare SOEs 
for sale upon being elected into office (Clar k, 1999), and subsequent ly introduced a “long-
term hold” policy (Cullen, 2003 b).  This policy p rovided a definitiv e view  on the 
Government’s stance on the corporatisation versus privatisation debate, and gave assurance to 
SOEs that they would continue to operate  under governm ent ownership and could plan 
accordingly.     
More recen tly th e Governm ent has taken steps to encou rage SOE expansion.  As  
noted previously, in 2006 the New Zealand Governm ent encouraged S OEs to broaden the 
scope of their operations into complementary markets and regions.  Gi ven the relative  size, 
economic importance, and financ ial success of vari ous SOEs, the Governm ent viewed SOEs  
as an important sector to foster econ omic development and growth.  As  detailed in Table 1 , 
SOEs are d iverse in n ature, often  with si zeable asset bases (rang ing up to $5.3 billion), 
substantial profit (up to $280 m illion p.a.) and dividends (up to $259 million p.a).  In 2007, 
revenue from the SOE sector represented appr oximately 5% of Ne w Zealand’s GDP.  Thus, 
the intention was for SOEs to expand the scope of their operations for the benefit of the New 
Zealand economy in general, thereby signalling he ightened expectations in terms of financial 
returns, but also noting exp ectations of appropriate beha viour in term s of risk and 
accountability.  Accordingly, in order to obtain  a clearer understandin g of the nature and 
scope of accountability  with respect to SOEs, it is in this co ntext that the risks perceived by 
SOEs and the related dimensions of accountability are examined.    
[insert Table 1 about here] 
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METHOD 
This study is based on a com bination of pub licly available texts and in-depth personal 
interviews, providing the foundations for exam ination from the outside and inquiry from  the 
inside (Evered and Louis, 1981).  In order to explore the dimensions of accountab ility from 
an external perspective,  exam ination from  the outside involved review of docum entation 
relating to SOE conduct, including legislatio n, m inisterial announcements, press releases, 
media reports, annual reports, and corporat e and Governm ent websites, to provide  
background detail on the operatin g environm ent of SOEs and accou ntability implications.   
Inquiry from the inside involved interviews conducted in two phases with senior executives 
from 12 of the then 17 SOEs operating in New Zealand.   
Diverse sources of secondary data provide d insight into the acc ountability of SOEs 
from a range of different perspectives.  Specifi cally, legislation presented clear, factual detail 
on the fra mework in which SOEs operate.  A nnual reports provided an overview of SOEs’ 
operations and specific issues fr om individual SOEs’ perspec tives, to gether with  audited  
financial data.  Ministerial announcem ents, press releases, and m edia reports contributed to 
the understanding of accountability issues and dim ensions from different perspectives, often  
with distinct agendas, biases, and influences ; and not always lim ited to factual detail.  
Drawing on each of these sou rces co llectively prov ided the o pportunity, first for  
triangulation, to verify the accu racy of the underl ying detail, and second  to estab lish a m ore 
rounded account of various issues from m ultiple perspectives.  Essentially, howev er, these 
perspectives were external and in the public do main, and thus, were supplem ented wit h 
internal perspectives – inquiry from the inside through interviews with SOE executives.       
Participation by a senior executive actively involved in the company’s strategic and/or 
entrepreneurial activities was requested fr om each SOE in early 2006,  prior to th e New 
Zealand Governm ent’s announcem ent on SOE e xpansion.  Consent to participate was 
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received from  executives of 12 SOEs, and a rrangements were m ade to conduct two 
interviews in person at each SOE’s prem ises (located in Auckland, Christchurch, and  
Wellington), over a two year period (m id 20 06 and m id 2007).  Interviews were sem i-
structured, ranging from one to one and a half hours, with discussion shaped by a  
comprehensive checklist of questions relating to the contemporary ac tivities of each SOE, 
and the related issues of risks, returns, and accountability implications.   
Specifically, the first phase of interviews included five main categories of questioning 
including (1) background detail  on each SOE’s activities and operations (e.g. did executives 
consider the SOE was working well under th e SOE reform s, was there freedom  of 
commercial choice an d/or freedo m from  politic al influ ence/interference, propo rtion of 
revenue from government versus non-governm ent sources, requirem ents for additional 
capital, pressure to repay cap ital, pressure to pay increas ing dividends), (2) background 
details on strategic and/or entrepreneurial activ ities (e.g. nature and de tail of such activity), 
(3) questioning on elem ents underlying thes e activities (e.g. inn ovation, opportunity 
identification, risk, and growth), (4) financia l outcom es of such activity, and (5) strategic 
context of the SOE’s operations (e.g. specific strategies, culture, use of branding, emphasis 
on cost m inimisation).  Analysis of intervie w data f rom the f irst phase of  interv iews 
highlighted clear accountability implications from the comm ents of several SOE e xecutives, 
particularly in the context of discussion surroundi ng SOEs’ operating contexts and risk.  
Accordingly, the second interview protocol was desig ned to sys tematically exam ine 
dimensions of risk and accountab ility in each of the SOEs, and included five m ain categories 
of questioning.  These categories included (1) an update on the progress and developm ent of 
the SOE’s strategic and/or entrepreneurial activity, (2) progress on the fi nancial returns from 
such ac tivity, (3)  aspec ts of  r isk and accountability specific to su ch ac tivity (e.g.  f inancial, 
commercial, political), and (4) updated inform ation on th e operating and regulatory 
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environment (e.g. did executives still consider  their SOE was  operating effectively under the 
reforms), and (5) governance and support (e.g. f ormal and informal support mechanisms; did 
SOE executives feel they received appropria te support from  the Board of Directors, 
Government etc.).       
Conducting interviews in two phases over a two year period prov ided a valuable 
longitudinal perspective (Villalong a, 2000), providing insig ht into the changing perception s 
and im plications of accountabi lity over tim e, particularly  as  New Zealand app roached an 
election year, and witnessed seve ral policy ch anges.  In m ost cases, the sam e executive was  
interviewed over the tw o year period.  In so me cases, SOEs volunteered two executives to 
participate (three SOEs), or had different executives participate over the two year period (two 
SOEs) due to attrition or unavoidable comm itments.  One interview of approxim ately one 
hour was also conducted with Jean-Pierre An dre, Senior Analyst of  the New Zealand 
Treasury, to gain insigh t into the regulatory framework and history of New Zealan d’s SOE 
reforms.   
Table 2 summarises the profile s of interviewees.  Due to requests for anonym ity by 
executives within three  SOEs, participants ( individuals and organisatio ns) are generally not 
identified by name in the discussion and findings section of this  paper.  The one exception to 
this s tatement is Je an-Pierre Andr e, who reque sted his participation  be record ed as an 
individual with extens ive exper ience within Treasury, rather th an an official Treasury 
spokesperson.    
[insert Table 2 about here] 
Data analysis 
In each case, interviews were recorded, tran scribed, and retu rned to interv iewees for  
confirmation and approval, prior to analysis.  Coding of t ranscripts (more than 400 pages) 
was then undertaken in two phases: m anually, and later with the use of NVivo.  Data  
 13
categorisation and th ematic analysis was an iter ative process which resulted in  a nu mber of 
themes emerging from the first phase of interview data.  In particular, multiple dimensions of 
accountability were identified with respect to  specific S OEs.  Accordingly, questioning 
during the second phase of interviews was stru ctured to system atically investigate the 
relevance, prevalence, and profile  (or nature) of accountability di mensions within each SOE.  
While clear dim ensions of accountability gr adually em erged through within-case analysis, 
these themes were reinforced and refined through cross-case comparisons.  Contrasting views 
and differing contexts for indiv idual SOEs also  provided d etail (e.g. m ultiple directions of 
accountability) and dep th (e.g. interrelated and  multi-faceted dim ensions) with res pect to 
accountability dimensions in SOEs.   
Mapping of dim ensions and directions pr oduced clarity f rom the complexity, as 
categorisations became increasingly clear, based on analysis and comparison of interviewees’ 
comments.  Table 3 summarises the developmen t of coding categories from  the process of 
data analysis.  In particular, the first colu mn presents ca tegories which were id entified 
inductively from the first phase of interviews, in response to questioning on risk with respect 
to strategic and entrepreneurial activity.  The second column shows how those categories 
evolved, and were refined through  an analysis of interview da ta from  the second phase of  
interviews, investig ating and exploring each of  the in itial accountab ility dim ensions.  The 
third column summarises the r ationale for the final coding categories, based on a collectiv e 
analysis of  the data f rom both phases of  interv iews, to gether with  publicly a vailable 
secondary data and accountability literature.  This final analysis process revealed a number of 
interesting findings relevant to both the dim ensions and directions of accountability.  These  
findings are presented below. 
[insert Table 3 about here] 
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FINDINGS 
Examination of publicly  available documentation relating to  the conduct and accoun tability 
of SOEs specifies a number of dimensions of accountability, including managerial (disclosure 
and reporting requirem ents), political (parliamentary scrutiny, select committees), legal (e.g. 
SOE Act, 1986, Om budsmen Act,  1975), professional (various industry regulations e.g. 
Energy Companies Act, 1992; Railways Act, 2005), public (e.g. m edia reports), and to a 
lesser extent, personal (e.g. reference in the SOE Act, 1986 to being a good e mployer and 
exhibiting a sense of so cial responsibility).  The complex nature and  multiple dimensions of 
these accountabilities, however, are indicated by comments from Jean-Pierre Andre (personal 
communication, 30 June 2006): 
All SOEs have two shareholding Minister s, the Minister of Finance, and then 
typically the Minister for SOEs.  They hold all the shares on behalf of the Crown;  
they’re acco untable to P arliament for perf ormance of their duties und er the [SOE] 
Act.  Min isters have ind ependent advisors: the Treasury fo r the Minister of Finance, 
and the Crown Com pany Monitoring Adviso ry Unit [CCM AU] for the Minister of  
SOEs. 
 
[Treasury] advise on comm ercial and financial perform ance issu es, fiscal issues , 
economic issues, balance sheet issues, strategi c issues.  With the two agencies there’s 
an issue of overlap; who takes the lead. So Treasury tends  to take the lead on balance 
sheet and economic issues; CCMAU takes th e lead on comm ercial and performance 
matters.  Ministers and their advisors have to be careful when getting involved with 
SOEs, that we don’t take away from the accountability of the Boards to do their roles.   
 
Thus, within the scope of upward m anagerial accountability, SOEs (and m ore 
specifically, the respective SO E executiv es) are answerable to a n umber of different  
authorities, includ ing the M inisters as shar eholders, central Governm ent, Parliam ent, 
CCMAU, Treasury, the Board of Directors, O mbudsmen, and Auditor General.  Sim ilarly, 
given the nature of SOEs, accoun tabilities to Government for political issues, also potentially 
extend to CCMAU and Treasury.   Despite thes e additional lines  of accountability, SOEs are 
intended to be m anaged sim ilar to private sector organisations, governed by com mercial 
Boards, and answerable to shareholders. 
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SOEs are subject to the SOE Act and that specifies the generic objectives for SOEs  
and the duties and obligations of direct ors an d shareho lders, and provides legal 
authority for the estab lishment of SOEs.  But SOEs are also com panies reg istered 
under the C ompanies Act, and those two Acts run side by side.  The SOE Act is all 
about transparency in the operations of SOEs; separati ng duties between m anagers 
and owners and accountability of the various roles.  
 
The Com panies Act does provide shareholde rs with cer tain powers to inte rvene in  
company decision making, for example, if the company is doing a m ajor transaction, 
which is defined as exceeding 50% of its assets or thereab outs, a company has to 
come to the Ministers to seek approva l (Andre, personal comm unication, 30 June 
2006).   
 
So, within a framework intended for public sector organisations to operate similar to those in 
the private sector, with Governm ent’s role bein g to advise but not interfere, what impact is 
created from  the Governm ent’s expansi on announcem ent for SOEs, and what are the 
accountability implications?  These issues are addressed below. 
 
Impact of Government announcement 
Based on discussions with SOE executive s, the Governm ent announcem ent in 2006 
encouraging SOEs to expand the scope of thei r operations has had very m inimal impact on 
the existing operations of individual SOEs. 
We were a bit bemused by the Minister’s comments in some respects, because we felt 
that we are doing that; being entrepreneurial.   It doesn’t change anything probably for 
us, at all (Senior executive, SOE A, 2006)3. 
 
I guess ou r position  with growing e xternally is that’s what we were do ing anyway 
(Senior executive, SOE F, 2006). 
 
Similar comments were made by most of the SOE executives interviewed, highlighting little 
change in SOEs’ operations.  
So you don’t feel that has an impact? 
None at all (Senior executive, SOE K, 2006). 
 
                                                 
3 Due to requests for anonymity from executives of three SOEs, individual SOEs and executives have not been 
identified with respect to interview data. 
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However, the announcement was viewed as positive by executives, who interpreted it 
as a signal of approval f or existing ventures, an d an indication that future proposals for new 
ventures would be supported.  Typically, SO E executives commented that the announcement 
had “opened the door” to think about more opportunities (Senior executive, SOE D, 2006). 
In essence, we have already been activ e in expansions; we ’re already present  
[overseas] across two different businesses.  And all the  initia tives that [ we’ve] 
undertaken offshore have effectively been self-funding.  So, I guess our signal is, we 
still need to consult with our shareholder if we do want to expand.  And I guess that 
also signals a greater likelihood th at the shareholders m ay be receptive to those 
initiatives, but at this stage we haven’t sa id ‘right, there’s a new opportunity here for 
us’.  W e’d obviously been considering th ose opportunities ourse lves anyway.  And 
with our existing presence [overseas], there are other m arket opportunities there that 
we’re already exploring (Senior executive, SOE J, 2006). 
 
An area of m ore topical discussion, howev er, in relation to the Governm ent’s 
announcement, was that of accountability im plications faced by SOEs undertaking new 
projects and expanding the scope  of their operations.  In this regard, SOE executives noted a 
number of issues, which are presented under the relevant headings below. 
 
Key risks and accountabilities identified by SOE executives: Managerial accountability 
 
When asked about th e key issues faced by SOEs  in relation to recen t entrepreneurial or 
strategic undertakings, the m ost common focus was that of upward m anagerial 
accountability.  The commercial su ccess of a pr oject, “the bottom  line” (Senior ex ecutive, 
SOE G, 2007), and the related issue of compet ition were regularly identified as a key 
challenge and priority by SOE executives.   
I think the biggest risk is not  being able to recoup your in vestment, and that flows on 
to the whole political risk, certainly when  the investm ent is questioned. So that’s 
probably the biggest risk, par ticularly for us,  when not o nly are we a comm ercial 
company, but we’re Governm ent owned. So the SOE fra mework is about being able 
to justify the investment, so that’s probably the biggest risk f or us, not to m ention the 
fact that we need a return that’s above market. 
 
Yes, it’s co mmercial risk, it’s risk asso ciated with new proc ess and  custom ers and  
consistency, and there’s a ri sk of retention of labour, all of which we’ve had to 
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address because of either comm issioning i ssues, or cultural ch ange with th e ne w 
structure (Senior executive, SOE B, 2007). 
 
 
 Given the nature of SOEs, however, su ch comm ents also indicate the clo se 
relationship between f inancial outc omes (as p art of  m anagerial a ccountability) an d other  
accountabilities including political and reputational dimensions. 
[The governm ent has] now com e out a nd made their statem ent about economic 
transformation.  And again there’s a politic al undercurrent to th at, as well as a  
commercial [aspect] (Senior executive, SOE D, 2006).  
 
 If we have a failure with this product, wh at is the ram ification for our reputation in 
our core business? And there’s also politic al aspects. I m ean people say SOEs are  
commercial organisations, well, they are, bu t there ’s a lso a poli tical aspect of an y 
public failure, and the impact on the Minister and the Governm ent at the tim e, so 
those things have to be considered as well (Senior executive, SOE C, 2007).  
 
Thus the interrelatedness of accountability dim ensions becomes a prominent issue for SOEs.  
The political and reputational dim ensions referred to above, are considered in further detail 
below.    
 
Dimensions of political accountability 
While executives highlighted the significa nce of upward m anagerial accountability, 
comments often reveal a political dim ension which is at times insepara ble from the financial 
or managerial context. 
We work on a no surprises basis, and so there’s a no surprises policy, and therefore 
we keep the Governm ent inform ed and the Minister.  And therefore, we’re alm ost 
getting a pre-approval, except that we’re not seeking approv al, we’re just saying this 
is what we’re doing. So if things went wrong, there shouldn’t be any embarrassm ent 
for the Governm ent there, because it’s been  a comm ercial decision that we’ve m ade 
as an organisation. So the comm ercial ri sk for us is the overriding consideration 
(Senior executive, SOE C, 2007).  
 
 This heightened awareness of political a ccountability was noted in several contexts, 
including references to the immediate Government, opposition parties, and changes identified 
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within the contemporary political environment.  With respect to the incu mbent Government, 
executives commented:  
Last year [the Governm ent] was talking a lot about wa nting SOEs to be m ore 
innovative, but on the other ha nd, they don’t want anyone to fail (Senior executive, 
SOE F, 2007). 
 
Similar comments noted by several SOE executive s highlight the inc reased tension and risk 
associated with entrep reneurial ac tivity in a politica l ar ena, where there is “ve ry little 
tolerance for any failures” (Senior executive, SOE L, 2006).  Thus , it may be argued that loss 
aversion is an im portant aspe ct of risk m anagement in SOEs, given their unavoidably 
political and public nature.  Further, political accountability and support (or lack thereof) in 
the context of non-financial matters, was also noted as a prominent issue in the minds of SOE 
executives.   
  And at the moment the Prime Minister has been pretty dirty on the SOEs, because of 
the Mercury  issue 4, because of the Solid Energ y issues 5 and inf iltrators in an an ti-
mining group.  Like on the Mercury affair, did the Prim e Minister stand up and say 
‘I’m accountable for SOEs, SOEs report through to [the Minister of Finance] and me’. 
And therefore did she treat Mercury  Energy as part of the government? No.  So when 
SOEs screw up…. It’s like, ‘that’s the SOE, they’re a separate en tity, a state-owned 
enterprise, and we’re going to knock them over the head and beat them around the 
chops with the regulations, and threats of regulation’. But if we announce a new  
[environmental project], she’ll  be the re tomorrow. It’s very p olitical at th e moment, 
very political (Senior executive, SOE D, 2007).  
 
 
 Ramifications of such success o r failu re were also id entified as exten ding beyon d 
immediate upward (political) accountability, to opposition parties and individual members of 
parliament [MPs] who have voiced criticism of the SOE sector. 
There’s some significan t success [within the SOE sector].  But it’s alw ays easier for 
the ‘Rodney Hides’6 to say ‘here, they burnt $2 million, which would have been much 
                                                 
4 In 2007 Mercury Energy, a subsidiary of Mighty River Power Limited, disconnected a customer’s electricity 
due t o non-payment of i nvoices, a nd t he cust omer w ho rel ied o n medical equi pment wi thin her home 
subsequently died (O’Sullivan, 2007).  
5 I n 2007 S olid Ene rgy was r eprimanded by  t he Government f or c ontracting private i nvestigators who hired 
“spies” to attend environmentalist group meetings (Hagar, 2007). 
6 Lead er of New Zealand ’s ACT Parliam entary Party, who has been a v ocal critic of v arious Govern ment 
policies. 
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better in the hands of somebody who’s unemployed in Otara’7.  And then people think 
‘yes, I’d like to get that’.  But you can’t translate that number down.  And they forget 
that the $2 m illion was never goin g to go anywhere near this purpos e; it was being 
either paid as a dividend, or paid in tax, or we might have bought new [equipment] or 
something.  So it’s not a raffle.   
 
The perception of that, or the reality of  be ing whipped f or f ailure; it’s  hard  to 
understand how you ge t over that, but in the political environm ent, literally, in th e 
current state; we won’t m ake any kind of  media comment about the entrepreneurial 
things that we’re doing  because we don’t want to have the oppositio n MPs watching 
that portfolio (Senior executive, SOE A, 2007). 
 
 
Thus, political accountability takes on a broade r m eaning in the co ntext of SOEs, as it  
extends unofficially but noticeably, to numerous political parties, and has a public dimension 
(considered further under the heading of ‘Public accountability’).  This form of accountability 
was also  no ted f or its  changing complexity over tim e, due  to  the  sea sonality of  politics  
leading up to an election, changes in Governm ent policy, and the regulatory environm ent of 
SOEs, each of which are considered below.  
 
Seasonality of politics 
With respect to the seasonality of politics, comments made by execu tives during the second 
phase of interviews clearly emphasised a political dimension which had not been raised in the 
first phase of interview s.  This second phase  of interview s coincided with New Zealand 
approaching an election year, a decrease in pub lic support for the Government, and some key 
policy changes.  In particular, interviewees commented: 
 You know, there’s political uncertainty becau se the Labour governm ent at the moment 
is polling badly.  So there’s an election in  14 months time…and we know that elections 
come around in New Zealand every three years,  and we know that six m onths prior to 
the elections…Governments st art going into election m ode…, and SOEs like ours are 
told to keep our heads down (Senior executive, SOE D, 2007). 
 
 The political risk s as we head into an el ection, are always  there. The propensity fo r 
politicians to do som ething stupid knows no bounds. And, so what we’ll see is, if we 
have any kind of business failure or even  potential failure, th e likelihood that the 
                                                 
7 Low socio-economic region of Auckland. 
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Opposition will try and  seize on it,  and try an d make mileage from it [is very hig h], 
even though they [may have initially supported it]. [Political risk and accountability] is  
always there, but we’re into the silly season (Senior executive, SOE A, 2007). 
 
Such comments were echoed by num erous executives, who noted th e lead up to  the election 
period was a high ly sensitiv e tim e, “chang ing the political env ironment hugely” (Senio r 
executive, SOE E, 2007), and linked to im plications regarding changes in governm ent policy 
and regulatory environments.  Each of these issues is considered briefly below.  
 
Changes in Government policy 
With respec t to po litical accoun tability, change s in Govern ment policy were viewed as a  
strategic response to various pr essures (e.g. econom ic, environmental, public); a change in 
direction which could enhan ce o r restrict SO E freedom .  Overwhelm ingly, however, th e 
potential for policy change (such as that encour aging SOE expansion) was viewed as an area  
to be treated  with caution, irrespective of whether the po tential change presented benefits or 
risks for individual SOEs.     
It did occur to m e when the Government announcement came out and said it was keen 
for SOEs to be entrepreneuria l and to take advantage of opportunities, [that] prior to 
that, the Government had almost moved in the other direction.  They’d felt the need to 
put out a d irection to all SOEs saying essentially it didn’t want SOEs leading the way, 
it wanted them m ore to follow the pack, you know, and not be pushing essentially the 
boundaries (Senior executive, SOE L, 2007).   
 
It’s amazing what a day in the life of polls can do (Senior executive, SOE E, 2007). 
 
Similarly, policy chang es in other areas (su ch as the environm ent), were also noted as a 
threat, potential or otherwise, in terms of the variability of government policy and significant 
implications for SOEs’ in terms of their operations and government support.  
 In December 2006 the Government issued a draft energy strategy, which when it comes 
down to it in brass tacks, it really was a draft climate change and energy strategy.  A nd 
so all of a sudden, the Governm ent finds itself in an embarrassing situation because it’s 
got the brand new gas turbine that just ope ned two weeks ago, that they don’t want to 
know about. And [there’s] plans to build another one, and they don’t want to know 
about that.  Two years ago we ha d support from  the Governm ent on launching our 
[project].  T he Prime Minister cam e and ope ned it for us.  Today, she won’t turn up.  
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There is absolutely no politic appetite for [our project].  Well the Government has gone 
green (Senior executive, SOE *, 2007)8. 
 
We’re in a lucky position at the m oment, in tha t what we’re  doing aligns with 
Government goals at the m oment. But you can’t depend on politicians for things, and 
the Government might change next year. So things can change I guess, is what I would 
say (Senior executive, SOE F, 2007). 
 
Thus, comm ents from  inte rviewees reveal th is aspect of politica l accou ntability is perhaps  
most chameleon-like, and very much an e nvironmental uncertainty for organisations 
operating in a public sector cont ext.   Variable, seasonal, a nd particularly challenging for 
SOEs in the lead up to an electio n, the risk  of policy changes being m ore frequent and 
immediate than changes  in SOEs’ n ormal busin ess operations due to internal m anagement 
decisions, was noted a prominent issue for SOE executives.   
 
Regulatory environment 
Another aspect of political risk  and accountability raised by SOEs  was that of changes in the 
regulatory environment.  This issue extends to both regulations governing the legal status of  
SOEs, as well as industry regulations establis hed by other Governm ent authorities.  W ith 
respect to the regulations governing SOEs, execu tives generally agreed that the reform s are 
working well, and that they have freedom of commercial choice, within the boundaries of the 
SOE framework.  However the uncertainty posed by a change in SOEs’ legal status (either by 
being privatised or designated as some other form of Government organisation), was viewed 
as a prominent issue.  
 Something that has exercised  the Board’ s m ind in re cent tim es, and  I guess it’ s a 
political risk, is the change to [our] owners hip structu re. There is from tim e to ti me, 
different political calls for [us] to no longe r be a SOE, a nd to either be one step 
backwards, a Crown entity, or right back to becoming a Government department. And 
those calls would grow if we were to unde r-perform, or perfor m badly or have m ajor 
controversy. That would be seen as quite restrictive on our ability to operate, if we were 
                                                 
8 In view of requests for non-identification, an asterisk has been used to preserve anonymity where comments 
refer to specific contexts. 
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sort of  d ragged back  more into the  f old of Governm ent (Senior executive, SOE L, 
2007).  
 
I think we have been the m ost talked about ‘for sale’ and ‘prepare d-for-sale’ but ‘not 
sold’ than any other SOE.  I guess mainly because successive Governments in the past 
just saw it as a no-brain er to sell us but wh en they tried to, it becam e too hard.  Treaty  
[of Waitangi issues]9, overseas investm ent.  W e have some [assets] th at are real New 
Zealand icons, and I think the public of New Zealand would just go absolutely ballistic 
if they knew it was go ing to be sold to private ownership.  So, it’s easy to say but a lot 
harder to do.  So more than any other SOE I think, we’ve been subjected to that, but not 
in the last five years (Senior executive, SOE E, 2007). 
  
Similar perceived “threats” of uncertainty with respect  to som e SOEs’ industry 
regulations were noted by a num ber of executives.  This was particularly ev ident in the 
context of SOEs operating as natural m onopolies, and those SOEs in the energy industry 
given the Governm ent’s policy announcem ent in December 2006 to significantly reduce 
carbon emissions.   
 I think if we swoop down to the zero divi dend level, then that m ight precipitate 
somebody saying ‘well actually are they a [commercial organisation] at all, or are they 
really jus t there to  prov ide a co re infrastruc ture’.  So tha t’s a risk  (Sen ior executive, 
SOE A, 2007). 
 
Such issues highligh t the extensive scope of political accountability in the context o f SOEs, 
and lead into the realms of professional accountability and the resulting public accountability 
implications for SOEs.  
 
Professional accountability 
Professional accountability was noted as both im portant and fragile, and cl osely tied to other 
forms of a ccountability (e.g. political, legal, and public).  Specifically, prof essional 
accountability is noted in the context of reput ation, and long-term  commercial implications 
for SOEs in general.  
                                                 
9 A greement si gned i n 1840 by re presentatives of t he B ritish C rown a nd New Zealand’s i ndigenous M aori 
chiefs, recognising Maori ownership of New Zealand land and other property, and giving Maori rights of British 
subjects.   Land  claims, negotiations, and  settlements remain ongoing between the New Zealand  Government 
and the Maori people. 
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If we had an  accident in New Zealan d that [we] were responsible for, our international 
business would stop probably.  W hy would you hi re us?  So that’s reasonably safe, but 
in the end it’s th at fragile.  So doing  what we do in New Zealand r eally, really well is  
very important for our reputation (Senior executive, SOE A, 2006).   
 
If you fail to deliver the public will express their dissatisfaction.  And also just f rom 
sort of a pu blic relations perspective.  If  there’s a train accident, th en it’s a bit lik e if 
there’s an aircraft accident, there’s a huge outcry.  Approximately 40 people a year get 
killed [in relation to railway incide nts] and 400 get killed  on the roads, but becaus e 
that’s all diffused and scattered around, then there’s not quite as m uch [concern]; it’s 
just sort of accepted largely.  W hereas if one person gets k illed at a level cross ing, if 
one child gets killed, then it becom es a very emotional public issue.  So we are very 
aware it’s a very unforgiving environment in a sense (Senior executive, SOE *, 2007).  
  
Hence, given the nature of SO Es, professional accountability is tied closely to the public as  
both consumers and citizens, and essentially exte nds to all SOEs in som e manner or for m.  
Further, professional accountability in te rms of conduct and com pliance with industry-
specific regulations, also represents a significan t challenge for SOEs.  By way of exam ple, 
Transpower’s operations are m onitored clos ely by New Zealand’s El ectricity Comm ission 
and Comm erce Comm ission, with areas of overl apping responsibility in an environm ent 
referred to as “dysfunctional” (Sexton in Rural News, 2006).  Ongoing difficulty in obtaining 
approval for capital projects, and the introduction of controls regarding Transpower’s revenue 
and pricing, resulted in dissention from Transpower, and tensions expressed by the  
Government, and through the media.  Transpower refused to comply with revenue thresholds 
set by the Comm erce Commission referenced to  the Consumer Price Index less one per cent 
(Transpower, 2005), and publicly referred to th e Electricity Comm ission’s regulations as 
“undermining Transpower’s accountability” (Transpower, 2005, p. 6).  The Governm ent 
expressed dissatisfaction at the lack of pr ogress, and Transpower’s conduct, advising 
Transpower to reso lve the is sues priva tely rather than publicly.  And the m edia voiced 
ongoing criticism  of Tr anspower, the lack of investment being m ade, and the inef fective 
regulatory environment (New Zealand Heral d, 2006; Steem an, 2006).  Thus, the regulatory 
environment in which T ranspower operates is complex, restrictive, and a potentially d ifficult 
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one in which to m anage the SOE’s professional obligations.  Such is sues overlap with leg al 
accountability, and the extent to which judici al review applies to SOEs’ operations, 
considered further below.   
 
Legal accountability 
As noted previously, all com panies in New Z ealand are sub ject to the Com panies Act and 
Fair Trading Act, as well as various other i ndustry-specific legislation and regulations.  
Hence, mechanisms such as legal fram eworks, regulators, and judicial  review, represent an 
important channel of accountability for SOEs.  As indicated by the comm ents below, the  
scope of legal accountability ex tends not only to ex isting frameworks, but also the potential 
for future legislative frameworks and change. 
I wonder if there might be more regulation on the way in the next few years…and what 
the political appetite will be like (Senior executive, SOE G, 2007). 
 
Thus, while Transpower em erges as a SOE c onfronting challenging and unique regulator y 
issues due to industry regulators, existing legislation in general, together with uncertainty and 
proposed legislative changes have  at times, also posed significan t challenges for other SOEs.  
New Zealand’s impending emissions trading scheme, for example, represents an obvious (but 
not yet defined) challenge for SOEs, particularly  those operating in the electricity generation, 
forestry, and far ming industries.  Thus , num erous regulatory authorities and ongoing 
legislative change, suggests all SOEs face the challenges of multiple accountabilities, with no 
clear indication that the task of  managing these accountabilities is easier for some SOEs than 
others.    
 
Public accountability 
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The issue of public accountability and specifically public perception of SOEs’ operations was 
highlighted by numerous SOEs in various contexts.   
Because we’re a state-o wned company, people believ e, rightly or wrong ly, that th ey 
have the ability to influence or should have  some ability to influence our policies and 
our business and where we’re going and that  goes from NGOs and the ‘Greenpeaces’ 
in the world right through to the Minister of Finance.  So if  we were a p urely private 
company, we’d be able to basically ignore a lot of that pressu re (Senior executive, 
SOE D, 2007). 
 
Thus, public accountability is often extended informally, such that government ownership is 
often viewed broadly, and interpreted as public ownership.  Sim ilarly, public perception of 
failure and the perception of SOEs  being gove rnment-funded (which is correct in term s o f 
contributed capital, but not so in term s of  ongoing funding and operatio nal expenditure, as 
almost all SOEs are profitable, pay dividends  to the Governm ent, and then reinvest the 
remaining profits into th e business’ operations) were two aspect s raised by several S OEs in 
terms of public accountability.  The differences  in perception with respect to SOEs being 
government-funded are highlighted in the comments below. 
You know, SOEs are a lo t m ore risk aver se because they use the Governm ent’s 
money and governm ent funds, so we have to be very careful of what we do (Senior 
executive, SOE B, 2006).  
 
The general public still see us as a taxpa yer funded organisation, which is bollocks 
(Senior executive, SOE A, 2007). 
 
With a SOE, put sim ply, people see it as  you’re using taxpa yers’ money to buy 
something offshore, but you’re actually no t because you’re gene rating a profit, and 
you’re just reinvesting those profits (Senior executive, SOE G, 2007). 
 
This latter quote in particular was su pported by various SOE executives, highlighting 
the importance placed and staunch view held by some SOE executives on public perceptions 
and m isconceptions.  Irrespective of these di fferent views, however , public perception in 
general rem ains a very prom inent issue for SOEs, extending to financial responsibility, 
environmental responsibility, and social responsibility. 
It’s a b it hard to unravel whether it’s just  because we’re risk averse b ecause of th e 
industry. But m y sense is that there is re gularly an underlying worry in the Board’s 
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mind that says ‘how would this read in the newspapers’ (Senio r executive, SOE A, 
2007).  
 
There’s a perception by the average punter  that a governm ent agency is being a 
negative drag on our carbon footprint in th e country. But if we weren’t doing this, 
someone else would be (Senior executive, SOE E, 2007).  
 
I th ink just the inte rest and expec tations on us as a SOE have becom e very m uch 
heightened, and the pressure is immense. It ’s something that I feel on a daily basis, 
because customers now feel that th ey can ring, if they’re not happy with the serv ice 
they’re getting from us, and be on the news that night saying that yet another SOE is  
putting profits ahead of people (Senior executive, SOE D, 2007).  
 
The resulting pressure was a ddressed by m ost SOE executives in the sam e way, showing a 
clear preference for a low rather than a high public profile. 
The only tim es we hit the spotlight is when [we’ve failed to perform ] to the public’s 
expectations.  And I don’t believe that’s ha ppened for quite som e time.  So other than 
that, we’re pretty m uch below the radar a nd that’s how we  like it (Sen ior executive, 
SOE G, 2007). 
 
We are now, for exam ple, keeping o ur head righ t down because you hear [oppositio n 
parties] are looking for crap to dump on the SOEs, and so that’s the risk on this; the risk 
averseness.  And I don’t know what the answer to that is really.  In a nor mal 
commercial organisation, you take qualified risk and you understand the pain/gain 
equation, and you get over it.  And SOEs, in theory, can do that.  But it all depends on 
what the appetite [for risk] is (Senior executive, SOE A, 2007).  
 
Hence, concern regarding public accountability also extends from criticisms aired publicly by 
specific stakeholder groups, whet her to genuinely raise an issue of concern, or for the 
purposes of influencing  public opinion, as a ca ll for heightened pu blic accoun tability.  
Further, in som e cases, executives noted the impact of public perception extended to the  
Government, given the open communication be tween SOEs  and Gover nment, and regular 
advance endorsement of SOEs’ actions. 
Well I gues s when the m edia was eschewing that last year, it was the Governm ent 
coming under fire for having allowed us to do it, so if we’d proposed another such deal 
last year, in the m iddle of all that…I’m not sure they would have been too keen for us  
to go ahead (Senior executive, SOE L, 2007). 
 
Hence, we return to the notion of political  and managerial account ability being closely 
related to p ublic accou ntability for SOEs.  Accordingly, accountab ility for SOEs m ay be  
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viewed as similar to a web (Hodge & Cogh ill, 2007), encompassing numerous and complex 
dimensions.  These dim ensions a re closely related (public and professional), at tim es 
overlapping (political and public ), and in some cases almost  inseparable (m anagerial and 
political).  Underlying such findings are a number of importa nt in sights and  im plications, 
detailed in the following section. 
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Comments from interviewees hi ghlight the com plexities of accountability within S OEs, but  
also indicate the unique nature of accountability faced by a company answerable (formally or 
informally) to m ultiple stakeho lders with respe ct to a nu mber of  diff erent and at tim es 
conflicting dimensions.  The implications of these findings result not only in blurred lines of 
accountability, but also multiple directions of those lines, as shown in Figure 2 below.   
[insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
Specifically, Figure 2 reconsiders the dim ensions of accountability previously shown 
in Figure 1, summarisin g the multiple dimensions and directions of accountability, based on  
the comments of SOE e xecutives.  Thus, Figur e 2 shows the dim ensions of accountability 
previously considered  from  a theoretical pers pective, nam ely m anagerial, political, public, 
professional, legal, and personal.   Of particu lar note, howev er, are th e increased number of 
stakeholders, additional lines of accountability, and multiple directions o f those lines , which 
are considered below. 
As noted previously, one of the key differen ces of  managerial accoun tability in th e 
context of SOEs, is the  multiple stakeholders to whom SOEs are answerable (either formally 
or informally).  Based on the SOE Act (1986) and the Owner’s Expectation Manual for SOEs  
(CCMAU, 2007), SOEs are directly  answerable to the Minister of Finance and the Minister 
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for SOEs on behalf of the Crown.  However, as  part of the reporting process, various other 
organisations appointed by Governm ent such  as CCMAU, Treasury, Pa rliamentary Select 
Committees, and the Board of Directors, also ho ld roles and functions of authority, to which 
SOEs are accountable.  The issue of  multiple reporting roles in a m anagerial context gives 
rise to two issues - first, the risk of over-reporting (Gray & Je nkins, 1993), and second, the 
added task of educating author ities as part of the reporti ng process (OECD, 2006).  The  
Organisation for Econom ic Co-operation and Development (2006) emphasises the risk of  
inefficient public sector m anagement fram eworks due to over-re porting, and notes New 
Zealand’s SOE sector is vulnerable to such risk .  Further, the education process inherent to 
SOEs’ reporting functions, is also noted by various execu tives as  a  lim itation of  SOEs’ 
operating environment.         
The political clim ate changes obviously, and is of a shorter term  nature than a lot of 
publicly-held com panies.  [Norm ally] shareh olders are in there for a long tim e, so 
that’s the difference that SOEs have; the  education process is probably more frequent 
than what a publicly listed entity would go through (Senior executive, SOE G, 2007). 
 
Such lim itations ra ise the issue  of  rev isiting the SOE fram ework to consider areas for  
improvement or refinem ent.  In particular, appoi ntment of re gulatory authorities, Ministers, 
and Board directors for long-term  rather than short-term  periods, and im proving the 
education process of appointees to such posi tions, are tw o areas requ iring consideration, 
which provide clear benefits for the SOE framework. 
Consistent with the stream lining of reporti ng, and rem oval of inefficiencies, another 
important feature of accountability is ensuring clarity of the reporting lines.  Thus, in order to 
support the intention of the SOE Act (1986), SOEs’ managerial accountability to Government 
should be distin ct fro m SOE’s political a ccountability to Govern ment (OECD, 2006) .  
Despite m ost execu tives noting  that New Zealand ’s S OE refor ms are work ing well, 
comments from a number of executives indicate th e lack of clarity that occasion ally emerges 
in this context, such that managerial accountability crosses over to political accountability.     
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 We have daily conversations with [ Government], and we operate with a no surprises 
policy.  So the last th ing we want is f or Dr  Cullen [the Minister of Finance] to read 
something in the Dom inion Post tomorrow m orning, about [us] and not  know about it.  
So that’s our policy, and we tell them everything.  And all our press releases and all our 
announcements all go to them  first, sometimes well in advance, so they can then m ake 
suggestions without….we don’t want to see any  political in terference, because there’s 
not m eant to be any,  b ut th ere is  som etimes.  Having said that there’s a lot of no 
surprises the other way, or support back the other way (S enior executive, SOE D, 
2007). 
 
 The Government has become more interfering, and I’m sure all other SOEs will say the 
same.  They’re s till largely sticking to th e model, but they’re trying to bend it around 
the edges a bit (Senior executive, SOE E, 2007). 
  
Hence, while the blurred lines of m anagerial and political accountab ility do not seem  to 
dominate New Zealand’s SOE sector, an awarene ss of its existence is noted.  This awarenes s 
is im portant so th at s teps can  b e taken  to  ensure this issue  is neithe r ac cepted no r 
compounded; but rather resolved.  While the close communication between individual SOEs 
and the Government as shareholders provides a good foundation for an effective relationshi p 
and managerial support, it is also im portant that boundaries between managerial and political 
issues are clearly docu mented as requirem ents of a SOE fra mework, and adhered to by 
Government. 
Similarly, another im portant issue which em erges from  th is study, is the need for 
acceptance by various s takeholders, both internal and external, of the S OE framework as the 
structure within which SOEs operate.  W hile this a cceptance is no t in itself a form  of 
accountability, it represents an acknowledgem ent that SOEs are required to balance 
conflicting interests and competing objectives.  Hence, there is a need for SOEs to be able to  
demonstrate due process has been  undertaken as part of their decision-making processes.  
However, there is also  a need for a clear regulato ry en vironment to be estab lished by 
Government, and pubic accep tance of decisi on-making where due process h as been  
demonstrated.  The task of  achieving a balance  between multip le obje ctives was n oted by 
several executives.        
 30
 Yes, it gets very risky.  On one hand we’re  trying to act responsib ly and socially and 
compassionately with c ustomers who are having dif ficulties paying their bill; on  the 
other hand we’ve got a business to run and we ’ve got to make a profit because the law 
requires us to make a profit, because we’re a SOE (Senior executive, SOE D, 2007).  
 
 [With the] schizophrenic role of being on the one hand socially  and environm entally 
responsible, and on the other hand being commercially savvy, and there’s always going 
to be a conflict in that area (Senior executive, SOE E, 2007).  
 
Hence a regulatory framework which clearly id entifies various objectives of SOEs, s pecifies 
priorities between objectives, and provides de tail rega rding the base re quirements for each 
objective will assist in establis hing an environment where SOEs understand their obligations 
and can be duly held accountable for such obligations.  As noted by one executive: 
We [are expected to] show som e sort of social responsibility, although there’s no real 
definition of what that is supposed to mean (Senior executive, SOE L, 2007). 
 
Implications for theory 
Reflecting on the findings of this study, a key im plication for theory is the unique nature of 
SOEs, and the resu lting differences in accoun tability fram eworks.  While public secto r 
accountability has been  exam ined as dis tinct from private secto r a ccountability (Mulgan, 
1997b; Parker and Gould, 1999), this study highli ghts variation within specific types of 
public sector organisations.  Thus, SOEs are diff erent in term s of their objectives, reporting 
functions, and accountability oblig ations.  In particular, SO Es are both subject to and 
dependent u pon accountability work ing effectiv ely in m ultiple directio ns.  Hence, to be  
accountable for their own actions, SOEs m ust first have f reedom to govern their actions, 
highlighting a need perhaps for greater em phasis on governm ent accountability to  establish 
appropriate regulatory frameworks in which SOEs operate.   
 Acknowledging the inherently interrelated nature of accountability dimensions is also 
an important implication.  A distinct emphasis on political accountability for example, which 
is so closely tied to managerial, professiona l, and public accountabilit y in a SOE context, 
highlights the differences relevant to SOE accou ntability.  A s noted previously, this area of 
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research ha s been giv en little a ttention to d ate, and further work is  required to develop a 
better understanding of  the underlying theoretical  issues, and how they can be m anaged 
effectively.  Furthe r, the lack of emphasis on  political accountability in the contex t of SOEs 
suggests its importance is under-valued, and far more  influential than prior research indicates 
(Parker and Gould, 1999).  
 As noted by Palmer (1988) in the contex t of New Zealand’s SOEs, the accountability 
structure is perhaps m ore coherent and extens ive than m any commentators either realise or 
acknowledge.  Exploring and understanding the importance and function of each of these  
dimensions of accountability, however, is  central  to ensuring the framework of institu tions 
and influences is acknowledged and appropriate ly balances commercial efficiency and th e 
multiple dimensions of accountability.  
 
Implications for practice 
Based on the above, three central  contributions for policy-m akers can be drawn from  this 
study.  First, regulatory frameworks governing SOEs should consider (or perhaps reconsider) 
the efficien cy of accountability  in term s of the num ber of authoritative bodies S OEs are 
accountable to.  Second, the separation of m anagerial and political f unctions should be 
clearly documented and included as part of a SOE regulatory fra mework, so that both SOEs  
and Governm ent can be held acco untable for fulfilling th eir re spective roles.  And third, 
where multiple objectives are specified for SOEs, priorities and base oblig ations should also 
be detailed to provide clarity for S OEs and further enhan ce accoun tability with r espect to 
individual SOE’s conduct.   Each of these issues is considered briefly below. 
 Given the need to balance SOEs’ commercial efficiency and dimensions of 
accountability, arguably a review is necessary to  ensure duplication o r overlap of regulato ry 
functions d oes not ex ist, with app ropriate a nd tim ely action taken to address situations of  
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duplication (or conversely, gaps).  Ultimately, responsibility for such action should be clearly 
designated within central govern ment, and duly resolved.  In the case of Transpower, for 
example, both duplication and conflict with in for accountability d imensions resulted in 
compounding delays, and increas ingly blurred lines of accountability for m any involved.   
Arguably, lines of ultimate accountability traced to those with decision-making power should 
be both clear and clearly enforced.    
 With respect to the separa tion of  m anagement and political functions, again 
regulations need to be expressly stated, with  actions regularly m onitored and reviewed.  
Functions distinguished and em bedded in legislation for ex ample, would provide legal 
recourse and judicial review, further enhanci ng accountability at the governm ent level.  And 
last, in v iew of the m ultiple ob jectives and accountability dimensions faced by SOEs, it is  
important that the im plied is m ade express, and boundary conditions are clearly stated.  By 
way of exa mple, expectations surrounding soci al responsibility, and express boundaries in 
terms of what SOEs a re not allowed to do,  would provide im portant clarification and 
guidance to SOEs, as well as cl arify the im plications for SO E accountability.  Such lessons 
are important not only for New Ze aland’s SOE sector, but also provide valuable insight for 
other countries which have adopted perhaps mo re gradually, NPM reform s.  As noted by 
various commentators, New Zealand has been viewed as a lead er in NPM due to the 
comprehensive in nature of its reforms.  As su ch, it is a va luable context from which to gain  
insights on what principles and issues shoul d be adopted and avoi ded by other countries  
(Schick, 1989) pursing sim ilar NPM agendas.  Adequate regulatory frameworks, removal of 
duplication and blurred lines of  accountability, and acknowledging the multiple directions of 
accountability, are all important lessons from the New Zealand context.       
 
 
 33
CONCLUSION 
This study has exam ined the perceived risks and accountability im plications relevant to 
SOEs, going beyond theoretical conceptualisa tions and presenting empirically grounded 
research drawing on the insights and experi ences of executives from  12 SOEs in New 
Zealand.  A review of SOEs’ operations in  light of the New Zealand Governm ent’s 
announcement for SOEs to expand the scope of their operations into related areas revealed no 
significant changes in  the conduct of New Zealand’s S OE sector.  The accou ntability 
implications relevant to this announcement, however, were significantly more topical. 
 While this study has considered New Zeala nd’s SOEs in som e detail, exam ination of 
SOEs in other countries and contexts will essentially provide furt her in sight into the  
similarities and differences across borders and different regulatory frameworks.  In particular, 
how representative of other countries are the accountability findings on the SOE sector in 
New Zealand?  What differences are relevant in other countries to accountability in a SOE 
context, compared to public sector accountability in general?    
Examining the lines of accountability in the context of Ne w Zealand’s SOEs revealed 
an increased number of stakeholders, resulting in additional lines of accountability, as well as 
multiple directions of those lin es.  As government-owned o rganisations, with a comm ercial 
focus, SOEs are often viewed as state assets in  public hands.  As such, SOEs face (officially 
and unofficially) extended lines of ownership and accoun tability.  The im plications of  this  
extended accountability are such that these lines  can easily be blurred, and in order to 
preserve effective m anagement of the SOE se ctor, careful attenti on should be directed 
towards separating and highlighting the boundari es of those lines.  While this m ay be  
achieved through regulation and m onitored through public scrutiny it is im portant that those 
lines are acknowledged and respec ted by all stakeholders, so that SOEs can operate as 
intended by the reforms, and be accountable for those operations.  
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Figure 1 
Dimensions and directions of accountability relevant to SOEs 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
(1) upward – political accountability, managerial accountability 
(2) outward (or horizontal) – public accountability, professional accountability 
(3) inward – personal accountability 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Summary of SOEs operating in New Zealand as at 30 June 2007 
Company name 
 
 
Industry/  
Core Business  
 
Total 
assets1 
$m
Profit 
p.a.2 
$m 
Dividends 
p.a.2 
$m
AgriQuality Ltd Biosecurity services 54.6 2. 5 1.8 
Airways Corporation of New Zealand Ltd Air traffic control services 125.2 7. 9 8.8 
Animal Control Products Ltd Pesticide manufacture 5.0 1. 3 1.2 
Asure New Zealand Ltd Meat inspection 18.6 1. 3 .1 
Genesis Power Ltd Energy generation 2,041.5 68. 7 18.4 
Landcorp Farming Ltd Farming 1,379.6 25. 3 14.6 
Learning Media Ltd Educational products development 14.9 . 7 .03 
Meridian Energy Ltd Energy generation 5,339.3 280. 3 259.3 
Meteorological Service of New Zealand Ltd Weather forecasting 16.3 3. 1 3.4 
Mighty River Power Ltd Energy generation 2,708.4 96. 5 30.6 
New Zealand Post Ltd Postal services 3,733.8 58. 0 23.7 
New Zealand Railways Corporation Ltd (Ontrack) Transport 394.3 53. 7 .9 
Quotable Value Ltd Property valuation services 15.0 1. 4 .6 
Solid Energy New Zealand Ltd Energy generation 441.0 44. 0 6 
Timberlands West Coast Ltd Forestry 64.4 -1 .3 .4 
Transmission Holdings Ltd (now Kordia Ltd) Transmission services  205.6 12. 5 9.7 
Transpower New Zealand Ltd Energy infrastructure provision 2,888.3 93. 1 36.9 
 
1. Asset numbers are for the 2006 year, based on SOEs’ annual reports. 
2. Profit and dividend amounts represent 5 year averages for the period 2002-2006. 
Where a company has not operated as a SOE for the full 5 years, average numbers are adjusted accordingly. 
 
 
SOE 
• personal 
 
 
 
Central govt 
• managerial  
• political 
Public 
• taxpayers 
• citizens 
• customers 
• creditors 
(1) 
(3) 
(2) 
Internal External 
Professional
Legal 
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Table 2   
Summary details of interviewees 
Organisation Number of 
interviewees in 1st 
and 2nd interview 
Organisational role of interviewees 
SOE A  1, 1 General Manager 
SOE B  1, 2 General Manager and Chief Executive 
SOE C  2, 1 Chief Executive and Business Development Manager 
SOE D 2, 1 Strategy and Planning Manager and Communications Manager 
SOE E  1, 1 Chief Executive 
SOE F  1, 1 Executive Advisor to Chief executive, Senior Analyst 
SOE G  1, 1 Chief Executive 
SOEH  1, 1 General Manager 
SOE I  1, 1 Policy Advisor 
SOE J  1, 1  General Manager 
SOE K  1, 1 Chief Financial Officer 
SOE L  1, 1 Communications Manager 
New Zealand Treasury 1 Senior Analyst 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3   
Development of coding categories for accountability dimensions 
Initial coding 
categories  
Revised and final coding 
categories 
Rationale / Support for final coding categories 
Financial  Managerial 
• financial 
• commercial 
• competitive 
Interrelated aspects of a single dimension focused 
on managerial accountability Commercial  
Competitor 
Political (in NZ) Political 
• seasonality of politics 
• changes in government policy 
• regulatory environment 
 
Distinct aspects of a single dimension focused on 
political accountability  Political (international) 
Legal Lega l 
• legislation, regulation,  and 
judicial review 
Closely related to political and professional 
accountability, but essentially a distinct aspect of 
accountability  
 
Reputational Professional Represents the central theme of this dimension ( 
and thus has been reclassified as professional 
accountability), but also encompasses reputation 
  
Public Public  Distinct dimension of accountability, but also 
closely related to other dimensinos 
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Figure 2 
Dimensions and directions of accountability relevant to SOEs 
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1. Upward  - managerial and political accountability 
2. Outward – public and professional accountability 
3. Inward – personal accountability 
4. Accountability by political authorities to managerial authorities (4), SOEs (4a), and the public (4 b) to respect th e 
SOE framework, allowing freedom from political interference 
5. Accountability by professional bodies to the p ublic (5) , SOEs (5a), and political au thorities ( 5b), to estab lish 
regulatory environments which allow SOEs to operate effectively within the scope of the SOE framework  
6. Accountability by po litical au thorities to est ablish effe ctive r egulatory environments which allow profession al 
bodies to carry out their duties as intended  
 
Personal 
 
 
SOE 
 
 
Political  
• central government 
• ministers 
• opposition parties 
Public 
• taxpayers 
• citizens 
• voters 
• customers 
• creditors 
(1) 
(3) 
               
 
Internal External 
Professional 
Managerial 
• central government 
• ministers 
• CCMAU 
• Treasury 
• Board of Directors 
 
(5a) 
(4) 
(4b) 
(4a) 
(5) 
(5b) 
(6) 
(2)
Legal 
(2)
